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The terms of reference set out for this Colloquy summarize some of
the unjust effects of the policy of apartheid on black South Africans, and
correctly point out that "ending the legal and political structure of racial
domination alone will not redress the social and economic conditions cre-
ated by apartheid." The road which leads to the creation of a post-
apartheid government will naturally partially determine what options are
available to that government, and so, although the focus of this article is
on those options, attention will have to be given to the process by which
apartheid is dismantled.
At the outset, it is important to note that the goal of full racial equal-
ity, which I take to mean real equality of opportunity for members of all
racial groups rather than a utopian egalitarianism, cannot operate in a
vacuum. Just as there is a tension in international relations between the
fundamental principles of justice and order, so too there is a need to
balance the requirements of justice and of order, i.e., the need for effec-
tive and stable government, in the domestic life of any society. Even at
moments of crisis in a nation's life when the many who are suffering
acutely would regard anything other than the principle of justice as being
of secondary importance, the long-run well-being of the country de-
mands that balance be borne in mind.
Whilst therefore in no way underestimating the urgent need to redress
the inequities and injustices of the South African past and present, and
therefore the need for rapid and wide-ranging political change, the per-
spective I wish to offer will focus on the ability to provide resources for
effective and stable government by drawing on business and socio-eco-
nomic experience in Africa and elsewhere. It will also be necessary to
distinguish between the socio-economic effects of apartheid which can be
avoided or repaired with the dismantling of apartheid, and those which
are attributable to modernisation and which will therefore continue.
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The first major point I wish to make is that any post-apartheid govern-
ment will have to deal with the reality of limited resources. The capacity
of post-apartheid South African society to generate resources, and the
actual quantity available to that government, will have been affected by
the transitional period. The policy options then adopted by a new gov-
ernment will either enhance or deplete the resources available for urgent
socio-economic programmes. The fact of the matter is that South Africa
has elements of the First and Third Worlds. It is not an industrial nation,
but rather, is wealthy only in relation to its less fortunate African
neighbours. So for example, South Africa's GNP per capita in 1982 was
only twenty-five percent of Canada's, an industrialised nation with
roughly the same population. On the other hand, it was two-and-a-half
times as great as the average for its twenty sub-equatorial African
neighbours.
As a trading nation, South Africa can only preserve its mining and
manufacturing base if it retains its membership in the western interna-
tional economic system. This entails both maintaining and enlarging the
capital and technology inflows essential to an industrialising society, and
also maintaining the ability to compete in international markets. The
myth that South African businessmen who place a premium on economic
growth are self-interested capitalists collaborating with apartheid can be
exposed by examining the alternative of a sanctions scenario in the con-
text of South Africa's demographic and socio-economic realities.
South Africa has a population growth rate of 2.7 percent per annum,
and a typical Third World population profile with over fifty percent of
the population under the age of twenty. The difficulty of fulfilling even
the basic needs of a burgeoning population with respect to health, educa-
tion, employment, and general contentment can be quantified in illumi-
nating terms. Part of that difficulty is attributable to the legacy of
apartheid and the structural distortions introduced by the policy of sepa-
rate development. But part is the result of the strains imposed on society
in transition between Third and First Worlds, and would have been felt
even if there had been no apartheid. As things stand now, an annual
average growth rate of 5.5 percent in GNP is required to create employ-
ment for 250,000 or so new entrants on the job market every year. Such a
growth rate would not affect the pool of unemployed variously estimated
at up to twenty-five percent of the black population.
To make matters even worse, an economic growth rate just less than
the population growth rate could only be achieved by drawing on foreign
currency reserves for 3 percent of the country's investment needs. In the
two decades 1964-74 and 1974-84, South Africa's economic growth rate
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averaged roughly 5 percent and 2.5 percent per annum, respectively. In
the earlier period, 10 percent of investment needs was provided by for-
eign capital. In the latter decade, there was actually an outflow of 0.5
percent of invested foreign capital. This trend worsened during 1985 and,
the arrangement with South Africa's creditor banks reached in February
1986 notwithstanding, this trend will continue to worsen unless a reas-
sessment of the effects of sanctions and of isolation on South Africa takes
place. That is true even if socio-economic apartheid constraints are grad-
ually being removed.
Of course, it can quite legitimately be argued that disinvestment, sanc-
tions, and the withdrawal of foreign credit is a political vote of no-confi-
dence that can only be reversed once the South African government has
taken the appropriate political steps to dismantle apartheid. But sanc-
tions designed to promote such a goal in the short to medium term will
exact intolerable long term economic costs.
Recently, Xan Smiley, the respected commentator on Africa, sug-
gested that the undermining of the ideology of apartheid and the trans-
formation of the Afrikaner nation from a rural and blue-collar
background into a modern western people, had turned the majority of
Afrikaners into cheque-book consumers increasingly amenable to eco-
nomic coercion.' Smiley, however, missed the crucial fact that well over
40 percent of employable Afrikaners are now in the state sector, many
having retreated there from the agricultural and mining sectors. Such
people must be highly ambivalent about ushering in changes which
threaten their livelihood, particularly if a deteriorating economy makes
alternatives hard to find. It should also be noted that the state sector is
the chief beneficiary of apartheid.
What options do those in government and the security force, who re-
tain the levers of power, have in the face of sanctions? Merle Lipton in
her recent seminal work, Capitalism and Apartheid,2 has pointed out that
apartheid has been functional for those who have been able to pass on the
economic and other costs of apartheid policies to other groups or who,
lacking the ability to pass those costs on, have assessed such costs as
cheaper than submitting to what they perceive to be direct threats to
their security.
Initially, under a sanctions scenario, a substantial portion of the costs
can be passed off onto others-black migrant workers from neighboring
Southern African states, black South Africans, and South African
1. Smiley, A Black South Africa, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1986, at 33.
2. M. LIPTON, CAPITALISM AND APARTHEID, SOUTH AFRICA 1910-84 (1985).
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industry and commerce in terms of higher taxes and so on. In fact, this
process can already be observed. So far, government has paid a relatively
minimal price for the lack of foreign investment in South Africa over the
past few years and, recently, for the increasing capital exports, when
compared to the soaring job losses and the decline in living standards
experienced by the private sector. Yet, by the time the adverse effects
fully affect them, will the alternative which Smiley considers inevitable,
black majority rule under the ANC, look any more palatable? Smiley
answers that himself by commenting: "The ANC instinct, whatever its
newly projected image of tolerance and moderation, would be to domi-
nate. . . all the institutions of state, just as virtually every government
on the African continent does." 3
In any case, by encouraging black opinion in the view that whites can
be driven by concerted local and international pressure into making all
the concessions, sanctions will simply confirm the instinct of the ruling
National Party to go for a repressive and destructive siege. This is said
with no satisfaction or approval, but simply to illustrate the general prin-
ciple that human behavior is governed by perceptions of interest, and in
the pursuit of scarce resources, considerations of morality or absolute
justice will not be the governing factor. Nor can people be "punished"
into behaving well, particularly if they perceive alternative courses of
action.
The evidence from Africa to the north of South Africa coldly illus-
trates the general proposition that the capillary system by which econo-
mies and particularly Third World economies grow cannot be recreated
by fiat. It is difficult to reverse a trend of economic disintegration and
heightened conflict.
Zimbabwe is an instructive example of a country where the legacy of
conflict and sanctions have combined with harsh demographic realities to
mitigate the effect of reasonably wise policy choices. Zimbabwe was
more fortunate in retaining both a more developed infrastructure and a
higher level of skill, both black and white, than its less fortunate
neighbours who had also been through a "liberation" struggle. But,
partly at the urging of President Samora Machel of Mozambique, who
had learned from bitter experience, Zimbabwe refrained from translating
radical rhetoric into damaging socialist measures such as nationalisation
and wholesale land appropriation, which would have meant the rapid
loss of white skills and agricultural and manufacturing production.
3. Smiley, supra note 1, at 34.
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Despite his pragmatism in retaining much of the free-enterprise system
in agriculture and commerce and industry, Mr. Mugabe has found that
overseas private investors have failed to return to an independent
Zimbabwe. This seems partly due to concern over continuing socialist
rhetoric, and a consequent fear of nationalisation. It also seems partly
due to an enduring perception of political risk relating to domestic uncer-
tainties, and fear of the impact that instability and a deteriorating econ-
omy in South Africa might have on Zimbabwe.
In many respects, Zimbabwe's problems mirror those problems of
modernisation that South Africa is facing and will continue to face in a
post-apartheid society. The rapid extension of health and educational fa-
cilities to the population at large, combined with one of the highest birth
rates in Africa.and indeed the Third World (close to 4 percent per an-
num), means that an ever larger number of young black Zimbabweans
with high white collar aspirations are coming on to the job market. The
figure, currently around 100,000, will rise to 250,000 by the end of the
decade. Yet only 5,000 jobs are being created each year in the formal
sector of the economy, and there are no more people in employment now
than there were in 1973. Unless this unbalanced equation can be altered
by lowering birth rates and increasing wealth and job creation, political
instability must result.
To drive home the point: if multinational corporations disinvest from
South Africa, will they automatically return when a post-apartheid gov-
ernment is ushered in? Under a sanctions scenario, economic disintegra-
tion and a period of enhanced conflict suggests that there will be little
incentive to return to a market even more contracted than it is now
under recessionary conditions. This is particularly true when there will
almost certainly be concern about stability in the same way as in post-
independence Zimbabwe.
And what will happen to markets lost to South African products dur-
ing the sanctions period ? In the highly competitive world of nation
states, South Africa can expect no charity for its products, particularly in
areas where there is a surplus, as there is now in coal, sugar, steel, ura-
nium, and paper. Markets will only be regained by the ability to compete,
which in turn will require the absence of the distorting factors which so
many African governments have allowed, such as an overvalued ex-
change rate and high minimum wages.
The ultimate irony of sanctions, a sort of "revenge on OPEC" scena-
rio, would be if consumers of South Africa's strategic minerals were to
reduce their dependence on South African sources of supply and thereby
diminish one of the major sources of revenue for a post-apartheid state.
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Ignorance, poverty and repression, and not freedom, equality and de-
mocracy, will be the result of a post-apartheid society if it is created by
revolutionary means in which sanctions and disinvestment have played
their role. No phoenix will arise from the proverbial ashes, and questions
of blame or responsibility will be irrelevant. The more the consequences
of such a scenario are examined, the less unsatisfactory the slow course
of evolutionary change appears, however frustrating or agonising it ap-
pears to participants.
At the heart of business priorities for a post-apartheid society lies a
determination to retain and expand the wealth creating capacity of the
free enterprise system. Unless the system of government adopted in a
post-apartheid society allows individuals the freedom to make full use of
their talents, government will have fewer and fewer resources with which
to pursue the necessary priority of more equitable distribution.
The ethnic, quasi-socialist system of government pursued by the
Afrikaner oligarchy during the apartheid period has incorporated some
of the worst features of other centralised, bureaucratic, socialist systems.
It has proved itself incompatible with the requirement of an industrialis-
ing society for high economic growth. The process of reform instituted
in the late 1970's, and pursued somewhat unevenly in the 1980's, has
been partly the result of the changing economic interests of
Afrikanerdom as well as domestic and international pressures. In fact,
the emerging Afrikaner business elite really came to the fore during this
period. But, as noted above, there remains the political obstacle of the
core of Afrikanerdom who stand to lose more than they would gain by
pursuing reform in the political arena, if that reform is to be defined in
the zero-sum terms of majority rule against a background of a deteriorat-
ing economy.
Whilst businessmen would continue to strenuously oppose the central-
ity assigned to ethnic divisions in South Africa under apartheid and pro-
pose in its stead the principle of freedom of association, there remains the
troubling reality of the heterogenous nature of the South African popula-
tion. The African National Congress is a central actor which cannot be
wished away. Indeed, that organization ought to be legitimised, and its
leaders released, in order that they might play their rightful role in the
political contest. Yet, surveying the current crisis in South Africa, the
sad fact is that conflicts and divisions between black political groupings
based on ideology, interest, tribal identity, and the sheer competition for
influence, are deepening. Whites ought not to draw comfort from these
divisions: the whole inevitable process of reaching an accomodation in
South Africa is simply made more messy and protracted, and the task of
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a post-apartheid government more difficult, by these divisions. But they
are a reality, and only romantics or revolutionaries believe they can be
magically conjured out of existence or forcefully removed. Witness the
history of Africa to the north of the Republic.
The businessman's mind therefore turns to the federal option for two
reasons: first, because it seems to provide the most scope for devolving
and sharing power so that differences are accomodated and the interests
of minorities are taken into account; and second, because it is more con-
ducive to ensuring the survival of free enterprise and individual
freedoms.
Merle Lipton, in her book Capitalism and Apartheid, posits five possi-
ble strategies for a future South Africa: (i) retain both capitalism and
apartheid; (ii) have less or no capitalism (i.e., a larger state sector com-
bined with white domination); (iii) have less or no capitalism combined
with black domination; (iv) get rid of apartheid; i.e., have multiracial (or
non-racial) capitalism; or (v) get rid of both apartheid and capitalism;
i.e., have multi-racial (or non-racial) socialism.
Of these, Lipton says she prefers option (iv) because
I believe it could be achieved with less violence than any of the others; it
does not rule out subsequent movement towards more egalitarian, welfare-
oriented politics; and it is the only option compatible with the revival of
remnants of liberty and democracy: the degree of coercion required to en-
force each of the other options seems incompatible with this.4
Indeed, the adoption of a Bill of Rights, now a much-advocated move
in liberal and business circles in South Africa,5 is one way of helping
restore the classic Western democratic concept of the rule of law, so trag-
ically eroded during the apartheid era. A Bill of Rights, of course, would
not be worth the paper it was written on unless it enjoyed the support of
the majority of the population of South Africa. Yet one of the most excit-
ing and positive developments in South Africa currently is the concept of
finding common ground in the area of commitment to various freedoms
and common law principles, as a preliminary to getting a real negotiating
process off the ground.
Given all that has been said above, the negotiating process is likely to
be a hard and drawn-out one. There can be no quick fixes in a complex
society battling over the root issue of politics, scarce resources. But the
process of dismantling the socio-economic elements of apartheid, already
underway in South Africa, will go some way towards changing the
4. M. LIPTON, supra note 2, at 12.
5. The "Business Charter," published by the Federated Chamber of Industries, is one ex-
ample of this support. See Rand Daily Mail, Feb. 7, 1985, at 1.
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economic equation. By releasing unproductively used or wasted re-
sources, increased growth will be generated. The abolition of influx con-
trol, which is now a prospect by the middle of 1986, will remove one of
the fundamental impediments to the creation of a free enterprise econ-
omy, the absence of labour mobility. If this is coupled, as seems possible,
with both the accelerated elimination of the mass of red tape inhibiting
small business activity and the institution of a massive, labour-intensive
housing program aimed at meeting the backlog of housing opportunities
in urban areas, then a boost to domestic economic activity which would
have important multiplier effects in both the formal and informal sector
should be possible. An equally valuable indirect effect would be the re-
duction in population growth rates, since international experience has
shown that urbanisation and modernisation are the best forms of birth
control. Already, black family sizes in the more prosperous urban areas
are significantly smaller than in the impoverished rural areas.
Tackling the key areas of labour mobility, employment creation, hous-
ing provision, and small business activity would not require punitive
state participation. In fact, apart from the provision of land and basic
infrastructure, such a program would rely on releasing the hitherto con-
strained energies and talents of a broad section of the population. No
doubt the effect would be enhanced by a change in the tax regime, which
again is in prospect with the current Margo Commission. Also, hopefully
in 1986, ideologically motivated population removals will be finally aban-
doned, ending enormous human and financial costs. Similarly, when the
notion of homeland consolidation is abandoned, several hundred million
rand per annum may be saved.
The way such funds are then deployed should be constantly motivated
by the principle of more productive use, as well as more equitable distri-
bution. So, for example, in the field of agriculture, Zimbabwe has much
to teach South Africa in terms of maintaining productive white commer-
cial farms, while at the same time encouraging the rapid spread and pro-
gress of peasant farming by means of basic incentives. These incentives
include higher production prices, ready credit, and convenient storage
and processing facilities. As far as possible, the wasteful system of subsi-
dies and parastatal agricultural boards should be abandoned.
What can be saved in defence costs by the de-escalation of tension in
the region and the independence of Namibia may be used, as in
Zimbabwe, to provide at least temporary employment to many in the
form of a large standing army. This might also have value in terms of
fostering national identity and healing old divisions.
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As far as business is concerned, the drive to achieve a more representa-
tive complexion amongst employees at all levels will require a range of
affirmative action programs, some of which are already, though late in
the day, beginning. Greater worker participation in business, not just
through trade unions, but also through shareholding schemes and other
mechanisms, is likely. What is clear is that the complexion of South
African business will in many respects be transformed, though, as I have
indicated, the fundamental principles of private ownership of property
will perforce have to remain.
Yet the acts of commission and omission of the past will not and can-
not be overcome in a short period of time. It will be the choice of the
right policy options that will be crucial in determining just how long the
process will take and whether South Africa will claim her place as one of
the successful nations competing in the international market and simulta-
neously satisfying the aspirations and welfare of her people.
In this respect, some of the nations of South East Asia provide inspira-
tion, if not exact analogies. For example, Singapore in the late 1950's
bore a striking resemblance to South Africa in the 1980's: high unem-
ployment, poor living conditions, and inappropriate education for the
bulk of the working class. In Singapore, unemployment at 13.2% was
particularly acute amongst non-English speaking Chinese, a disadvan-
taged section of the majority Chinese community. Of the then-population
of 1.5 million living in an area the size of greater Durban, 76% were
Chinese, 15% Malay, 7% Indian and 2% "other." The population
growth rate was 4.4%, and Singapore's demographic distribution was
then almost identical to South Africa's today with 43% of the population
being under the age of 15 years.
A middle-class group of Chinese socialists led by Lee Kuan Yew rode
to power on a communist platform. This group, in two decades of prag-
matic rule marked by vision and will, and a mix of democracy and au-
thoritarianism, managed to transform Singapore into one of the success
stories of the early 1980's. Recent "hiccups" in performance only serve
to underline the point that successful policies and formulae need revision
in the face of changing circumstances. Particularly instructive was their
choice of a concerted attack on the housing backlog to resolve economic
problems and enhance political legitimacy. Though the state oversaw the
process, the Housing and Development Board enjoyed large measures of
autonomy in terms of policy, administration, and finance. The same kind
of cooperation between the state and the private sector would seem to be
appropriate for South Africa's circumstances if the 250,000 housing units
Vol. 11:38, 1985
Relly: Post-Apartheid South Africa
per year required to provide for the estimated future needs and the huge
existing backlog is to be met.
In the late 1950's, in a message which is particularly pertinent now for
all present South African leaders, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, then-Finance
Minister and now widely acknowledged as the architect of Singapore's
economic miracle, had this to say:
I want to make it clear that I am not against the welfare state. All mod-
em societies, whether based on private enterprise or on the communist sys-
tem, move towards the welfare state in their advanced stages of
development. What I am opposed to is the belief that the good things of life
can be got without sustained effort, and that it is the duty of a good govern-
ment to act as the universal provider. In our present stage of development
in Singapore, we are not rich enough to be able to set up the welfare state.
Our first preoccupation should therefore be the accumulation of wealth
through economic growth rather than a more equal distribution of existing
wealth and a proliferation of state welfare services. The early stage of eco-
nomic growth, be it through capitalism or communism, is necessarily a
cruel and harsh process. . . . There is no easy way to grind out of the
mass of poor people the economic surplus or savings needed to finance capi-
tal accumulation. Victorian England and Stalinist Russia went through the
process of capital accumulation and there is no reason to expect that the
backward countries of the world can hope to escape the same traumatic
experience if they want to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. The
trouble is that, given the traditional order and the prevailing ethos, none of
their leaders dares even to contemplate the stem measures that need to be
taken to propel their societies forward.6
This is a lesson that has been hard-learned in Africa. But after 25 years
of post-colonial independence, more and more African states are looking
to slim down bloated and inefficient public sectors and to stimulate the
wealth creating private sector. It would be a tragedy if South Africa were
to determinedly set off down a path which the rest of Africa after painful
experience was just beginning to quit.
The progress of Man from barbarism to civilization has been erratic
and, in aggregate in the world, pretty slow. Apartheid, and a naive predi-
lection for sanctions, are a regression on the path as much as war and
terrorism. South Africa's affairs are much too complex, its problems too
deep-seated and the nature of possible solutions probably too unusual for
demands from at home, and abroad, for instant resolutions based on a
simplistic division between the apparent "baddies" and the putative
"goodies" to be accomodated.
6. G. Swee, Speech of Jan. 30, 1967, reprinted in A. Bhide, Singapore A 24-25 (1980)
(Harvard Business School unpublished case study) (on file with the author).
